New Trial: Use of Affidavits from Jurors To Impeach the Verdict (Goff v. Kinzle, Mont. 1966) by Cromley, Brent Reed
Montana Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 1 Fall 1966 Article 9
7-1-1966
New Trial: Use of Affidavits from Jurors To
Impeach the Verdict (Goff v. Kinzle, Mont. 1966)
Brent Reed Cromley
University of Montana School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Legal Shorts is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana
Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Brent Reed Cromley, New Trial: Use of Affidavits from Jurors To Impeach the Verdict (Goff v. Kinzle, Mont. 1966), 28 Mont. L. Rev.
(1966).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol28/iss1/9
RECENT DECISIONS
A determination of the fairness of any distribution is likely to be
influenced by the needs of the stepchildren. For instance, they may have
been dependent on the stepparent because of age or physical disability.
Thus, it might seem unfair to evict a minor stepchild from decedent's
family home in favor of a distant relative who has no need for it himself.
Also, the death of the stepparent may place heavy burdens on a stepchild
who is left with a moral obligation to wind up the decedent's affairs.
Another consideration would be the nature of the property to be
distributed. If decedent's property was largely obtained from the step-
child's natural parent, it would seem manifestly unfair to exclude the
stepchild. The same would be true of property developed or acquired
through a joint family effort in which the stepchild participated. How-
ever, giving stepchildren a share in the family heirlooms or other senti-
mental property might lead to additional difficulties in an area already
a frequent source of family argument.
The instant case was clearly erroneous in its legal analysis. Further,
if the case is understood to stand for the proposition that stepchildren
inherit as natural children, it is unacceptable as a general rule of law.
However, if the decision had been based on a rule taking into considera-
tion the special circumstances of each case, the result would be quite
acceptable, since the decedent had no natural children and he raised the
stepdaughter as if she were his own.
JOSEPH T. SWINDLEHURST.
NEW TRIAL: USE OF AFFIDAVITS FROM JURORS TO IMPEACH THE VERDICT.
-After a verdict for defendant in an auto negligence case, counsel for
plaintiff submitted affidavits from jurors showing that the foreman
had made an independent investigation of the accident scene. Held:
Affidavits of jurors that bring to the court's attention facts of irregular-
ity and misconduct are competent to sustain a motion for a new trial.
Goff v. Kinzle, 417 P.2d 105 (Mont. 1966).
An English jury sitting in 1785 tossed a coin to determine a verdict.
Chief Justice Lord Mansfield used the occasion to expand the doctrine
of nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audietur' by declaring that the ver-
dict could not be disturbed solely on the basis of affidavits from jurors.
Instead, to show jury misconduct "the Court must derive their knowl-
edge from some person having seen the [misconduct] through a window,
or by some such means."2
The Mansfield Rule was carried over to the United States and ap-
'No man alleging his own infamy will be heard. Also expressed as allegans suain
turpitudinum non est audiendus; one who alleges his own infamy is not to be he/rd.
Vaise v. Delaval, 1 Term Rep. 11, 99 Eng.Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
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plied to a wide variety of jury misconduct. 3 In 1866 Justice Cole modi-
fied the restriction against jurors' affidavits by stating what is now
called the Iowa Rule:
[A]ffidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of avoiding a
verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury
room which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that ajuror was improperly approached by a party, his agent, or attorney;
that witnesses or others conversed as to the facts or merits of the
cause, out of court and in the presence of jurors; that the verdict was
determined by aggregation and average or by lot, or game of chance
or other artifice or improper manner; but that such affidavit to
avoid the verdict may not be received to show any matter which does
essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did not
assent to the verdict; that he misunderstood the instruction of the
court; the statements of the witnesses or the pleadings in the case;
that he was unduly influenced by the statements or otherwise of his
fellow jurors, or mistaken in his calculations or judgment, or other
matter resting alone in the juror's breast. 4
The common law Mansfield Rule is still the majority rule in the
United States, 5 although criticized by legal theoreticians. 6 Several states
have modified the Mansfield Rule by statute.7
Decades of litigation have yielded many arguments supporting and
attacking the Mansfield Rule. Common arguments for exclusion of jurors'
'For example, courts have said that they would exclude affidavits of jurors tending
to show that a juror was intoxicated, Snyder v. Town of Chinook, 48 Mont. 484, 138
Pac. 1090 (1914); that the verdict was a quotient verdict, McDonald v. Pless, 238
U.S. 264 (1915); that a juror had taken an unauthorized view of the scene of the
accident in question, Maffeo v. Holmes, 47 Cal.App.2d 292, 117 P.2d 948 (1941);
that the jury had made a mistake in its calculation of damages, Bateman v. Donovan,
131 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1943); that a juror had concealed prior prejudice during the
voir dire examination, Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal.2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958); thatjurors read a newspaper article prejudicial to a party, Schaff v. Shaules, 137 Mont.
357, 352 P.2d 265 (1960); that the jury had misunderstood the instructions of the
court, Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331, 372 P.2d 414 (1962).
'Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866).
566 C.J.S. New Trial §169(b) (1950).
6MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 148 (1954); 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2354 (MeNaughton
rev. ed. 1961). The American Law Institute has proposed a rule similar in substance
to the Iowa Rule:
Whenever any act, event or condition known to a member of a petit or
grand jury is a subject of lawful inquiry, any witness, including every
member of the jury, may testify to any material matter, including any
statement or conduct or condition of any member of the jury, whether
the matter occurred or existed in the jury room or elsewhere, and whether
during the deliberations of the jury, or in reaching or reporting its
verdict or finding, or in any other circumstances, except that upon an issue
as to the validity of a verdict or indictment no evidence shall be received
concerning the effect which anything had upon the mind of a juror as
tending to cause him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment
or concerning the mental processes by which it was reached. MODEL CODE
or EVIDENCE rule 301 (1942).
7For example, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §657(2) provides:
[W]henever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to
any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted
to them by the court, by a resort to the determination of chance, such
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
Identical statutes have been adopted by Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. §10-602 (1948));
Montana (REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §93-5603(2)); North Dakota
(N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)); South Dakota (S.D.CoDE §33.1605 (Supp. 1960)); Utah
(UTAH R.CIv.P. 59(a)2); and Washington (WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §4.76.020 (1962)).
Kansas has adopted the Uniform Law of Evidence which embodies the same concept
as the Iowa Rule and which is discussed later in this article. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ ;0-441, 60-443, 60-444 (1964).
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affidavits are that public policy demands stability in verdicts,8 that
jurors' deliberations must be private or frankness and freedom of dis-
cussion are prevented,9 that prolonged litigation should be avoided,' 0
and that the verdict being the sum of the conclusions and beliefs of the
jurors, they should not later be heard to deny it."
Other arguments for exclusion are based upon the vulnerability of
verdicts which would result. Thus courts argue that if affidavits of
jurors were allowed, doors would be opened to inquiry and harassment
of jurors to determine whether misconduct occurred ;12 parties would
attempt to bribe or otherwise induce jurors to submit affidavits showing
misconduct which did not actually occur ;13 and a juror himself could
later destroy a verdict with which he disagreed. 14 Courts often state that
even when misconduct has occurred, a juror is not capable of knowing
whether the misconduct influenced his verdict or not.15
Jurists advocating admission of affidavits from jurors as a basis for a
new trial claim that only history-not logic or reason-supports the
Mansfield Rule. 16 They argue that the jury must base its findings on
evidence presented in the courtroom or authorized by the court ;17 that
public policy demands jury misconduct the discouraged ;18 and that the
best evidence is excluded because the jury is most likely to know the facts
regarding the misconduct. 19 To rebut arguments on the vulnerability of
verdicts, opponents of the Mansfield Rule point out that admission of
jurors' affidavits doesn't necessarily mean a new trial will be granted:
the evidence must still sustain a burden of proof within the discretion of
the trial judge.20 Tampering with a juror is not a problem because overt
acts of misconduct are accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors-
'it is useless to tamper with one, for the eleven may be heard."'2 1 The
Iowa Rule is urged as a replacement for the Mansfield Rule on the
ground that even if not competent for proving matters which inhere in
the verdict, jurors' affidavits are as dependable as any other evidence
for showing independent facts.22
8 Sopp v. Smith, 59 Cal.2d 12, 377 P.2d 649, 653 (1963); Sutton v. Lowry, 39 Mont.
462, 104 Pac. 545, 548 (1909).
9McDonald v. Pless, supra note 3, at 267-68; Maffeo v. Holmes, supra note 3, at 950.
'
0Sopp v. Smith, supra note 8, at 653.
nBateman v. Donovan, supra note 3, at 765; Kollert v. Cundiff, supra note 3, at 901.12McDonald v. Pless, supra note 3, at 268; Kollert v. Cundiff, supra note 3, at 900.
"State v. Beesskove, 34 Mont. 41, 85 Pac. 376, 378 (1906); State v. Kociolek, 20
N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812, 815, 58 A.L.R.2d 545, 551 (1955).
"
4 Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Cullerton, 147 Ill. 385, 35 N.E. 723, 724 (1893); Sopp
v. Smith, supra note 8, at 653.
'Maffeo v. Holmes, supra note 3, at 951.
1"Sopp v. Smith, supra note 8, at 652-53.
'
TPeppereorn v. City of Black River Falls, 89 Wis. 38, 61 N.W. 79, 80 (1894).
1 Kincaid v. Wade, 196 Kan. 174, 410 P.2d 333, 337 (1966).
"Sopp v. Smith, supra note 8, at 653.
20Ibid.
'Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-49 (1892).
"Ibid.; Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., supra note 4, at 211;12.
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In Montana., the granting of a new trial is a statutory remedy.23
The REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, Section 93-5603(2), provides for a
new trial on the ground of jury misconduct. It specifically states that when
the verdict was reached by a resort to a determination of chance, the
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. ' 4
Until 1966 the Montana Supreme Court had consistently interpreted the
statute as excluding juror affidavits except when the motion for a new
trial was based upon a chance verdict.2 5
But in the instant case, the Supreme Court said that the exclusionary
rule is not applicable to affidavits which bring to the court's attention
facts of irregularity and misconduct.26 The Court relied upon an earlier
1966 Montana case, Putro v. Baker,27 and a 1966 Kansas case, Kincaid v.
Wade.2 8 During the trial of Putro v. Baker a local newspaper published an
article mentioning that the defendant had pleaded guilty to a man-
slaughter charge arising out of the same auto collision. The trial court
took defendant's motion for a mistrial under advisement until the ver-
dict was rendered for the plaintiff. After polling the jury on the effect
of the article upon the verdict, the trial court decided that it had not been
prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause for
a new trial, saying that a mistrial should have been granted because the
article was bound to have prejudicial effect.29 Evidence from jurors im-
peaching the verdict was not a question.
The jury misconduct in the Kansas case, Kincaid v. Wade, was simi-
lar to that of the instant case. However, Kansas is the only state to have
adopted the Uniform Law of Evidence 0 The Uniform Law does not
allow evidence showing the effect of any conduct or event upon the
mental processes of a juror but specifically provides that a juror is not
excluded from showing "conditions or occurrences either within or outside
of the jury room having a material bearing on the validity of the
verdict."
31
California and Washington, with identical statutes,32 have inter-
preted them differently. In fact situations essentially identical to that
of Goff v. Kinzle, California will not allow jurors' affidavits as grounds
"State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 55 Mont. 602, 179 Pac. 831, 832-33 (1919);
Komposh v. Powers, 75 Mont. 493, 244 Pac. 298, 305 (1926).
"The identical California statute is quoted supra note 7. (REVISED CODES OF MONTANA
are hereinafter referred to as R.C.M.).
"State v. Beesskove, supra note 13; State v. Lewis, 52 Mont. 495, 159 Pac. 415 (1916);
Hough v. Shishkowsky, 99 Mont. 28, 43 P.2d 247 (1935); State Highway Comm'n v.
Manry, 143 Mont. 382, 390 P.2d 97 (1964).
"Instant case at 108.
1147 Mont. 139, 410 P.2d 717 (1966).
"196 Kan. 174, 410 P.2d 333 (1966).
'Putro v. Baker, supra note 27, at 723.
°9A UNIF. LAWS ANN. 589 (1965). The Kansas statute is cited supra note 7.
"'UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 41, 44.
"These states' respective statutes are cited supra note 7.
[Vol. 28
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for a new trial.33 This is true even when it is apparent that a private
investigation of an auto accident scene has provided information prejudi-
cial to one party. In Maffeo v. Holmes,3 4 jurors' affidavits disclosed that
a private investigation had helped them to "understand how Mrs. Holmes
(the successful defendant) could have driven where she drove without
seeing deceased. '35 California does have a judicial exception to the
statute allowing affidavits from jurors where they establish bias or
prejudice of a juror concealed during voir dire.36 In Williams v. Bridges,3 T
the court recognized this exclusionary rule and the California statute.
However, it justified admission of jurors' affidavits to show concealed
jury bias on the ground that there were no California cases holding other-
wise on that specific instance of misconduct.31 In Maffeo v. Holmes the
court distinguished this exception, explaining that bias concealed during
voir dire necessarily affects the verdict, whereas other forms of misconduct
occurring after the jury has been impaneled require a showing that the
misconduct improperly influenced the verdict.39
Washington courts have accepted the Iowa Rule.40 Gardner v.
Malone41 was another auto negligence suit in which a juror made a private
investigation of the accident scene. The Washington Supreme Court
there explained that only when the facts alleged inhere in the verdict do
they impeach the verdict; if the facts do not inhere in the verdict, "it
then becomes a matter of law for the trial court to decide the effect
the proved misconduct could have had upon the jury. '42
It is submitted that the instant case is not supported by the law of
Montana. Prior interpretations of Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Sec-
tion 93-5603(2) have strictly construed the statute and allowed prior
affidavits only when the verdict was arrived at by chance. The Court
failed to justify its decision in any meaningful way, and left open the
question as to how the statute would be construed in future cases.
If the exception to the exclusionary rule is not to be limited to ver-
dicts arrived at by chance, the reference thereto is meaningless and can
lead only to confusion. 43  This confusion was amplified in the latest
3'Kollert v. Cundiff, supra note 3. In 1962, California did grant a new trial solely
on the basis of affidavits from jurors showing that they had made a private investi-
gation of the auto accident scene in litigation. Sopp v. Smith, 22 Cal.Rptr. 436(1962). This decision was reversed on appeal, one justice dissenting. Sopp v. Smith,
supra note 8.
"Supra note 3.
'Id. at 950.
1Williams v. Bridges, 140 Cal.App. 537, 35 P.2d 407 (1934); Maffeo v. Holmes, supra
note 3; Kollert v. Cundiff, supra note 3; State Dep't of Water Resources v.
Natomas Co., 49 Cal.Rptr. 64 (1966).
"TSupra note 36.
"Williams v. Bridges, supra note 36, at 409.
"Maffeo v. Holmes, supra note 3, at 951.
'Dibley v. Peters, 200 Wash. 100, 93 P.2d 720 (1939); Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wash.2d
836, 376 P.2d 651 (1962).
"Supra note 40.
"Gardner v. Malone, supra note 40, at 654.
"Besides the various interpretations by California, Montana and Washington discussed
1966]
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reported case on the point, Schmoyer v. Bourdeau.4 4 The Court there held
that jurors' affidavits could be used to impeach a verdict on other grounds
than that specified in 93-5603(2). However, the Court did not say on
what conditions this would be allowed. The Court further stated that
they were not overruling their previous holdings.
In view of the confusion necessarily arising from the two latest
cases, it is desirable that the law be clarified. It is submitted that the
relevant sections of the Uniform Law of Evidence be considered. These
sections provide as follows:
Rule 41. Evidence to Test a Verdict or Indictment.-Upon an inquiry
as to the validity of a verdict or an indictment no evidence shall be
received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or con-
dition upon the mind of a juror as influencing him to assent to or dis-
sent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the mental
processes by which it was determined.
Rule 43. Testimony by a Juror.-A member of a jury sworn and em-
panelled in the trial of an action, may not testify in that trial as a
witness.
Rule 44. Testimony of Jurors Not Limited Except by These Rules.-
These rules shall not be construed to (a) exempt a juror from testi-
fying as a witness, if the law of the state permits, to conditions or
occurrences either within or outside of the jury room having a ma-
terial bearing on the validity of the verdict or the indictment, except
as expressly limited by Rule 41; * * *
These rules do not require, and in fact do not allow, an impeaching
juror to recognize and relate the effect of any misconduct upon his
decision in the case. The jury then becomes merely an additional source
-albeit a very important one-from which evidence of misconduct during
a trial can be obtained. Able to consider all the evidence, the court can
make a more enlightened and just ruling on a motion for a new trial.
BRENT REED CROMLEY.
in the article, consider the interpretations of the four other states with the identical
statute (statutes cited supra note 7):
Idaho has excluded jurors' affidavits except when the verdict was the result of
chance. Dawson v. Eldredge, supra note 3; Robinson v. White, 414 P.2d 666 (Idaho
1966). North Dakota, without citing its statute, accepted the Iowa Rule in James
Turner & Sons v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 67 N.D. 347, 272 N.W. 489 (1937), but
discussion in a later case is unclear and implies a more exclusionary position. Grenz
v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681, 691-93 (N.D. 1964).
South Dakota has consistently excluded affidavits from jurors except when the
verdict was reached by chance. Brown v. Draeger, 51 S.D. 190, 212 N.W. 869 (1927).
But compare the dictum in Elfert v. Witt, 73 S.D. 4, 38 N.W.2d 445, 448 (1949).
Utah strictly interprets its statute. Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97
Utah 205, 91 P.2d 507 (1939); Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah 2d. 240, 408 P.2d 709
(1965).
"23 State Rep. 781 (Mont. 1966).
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